

21 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

After having reviewed all of the documents pertaining directly, or indirectly, to the loss of []C025C near Pao Tou I have attempted to analyse what went wrong. I envision someone with a keen legal mind completing the review of these documents with the following conclusions or questions:

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QUESTION (1): Did you know prior to the launch of Mission C025C to Pao Tou that there were SAM sites in the area prior to release of the mission?

ANSWER. No, we did not.

QUESTION (2): Did you ask NPIC to make a special search of the latest KH photography covering Pao Tou to determine if any SAM's were present?

ANSWER (?) : Before answering this question may I ask what prompted this question?

QUESTIONER : It seems evident that after the incident at
Lan Chou only recently, where the pilot was

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apparently shot at by SAM's, that such a search was in order.

ANSWER : I don't understand the reasoning behind that. We did not ask NPIC for a special search of the Lan Chou area prior to the launch of that mission, yet we felt that, like Pao Tou, there probably should have been a SAM there. We found SAM sites near Lan Chou before, but they had

[redacted] or reported as

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abandoned by NPIC. We did ask NPIC to search

[redacted] which covered Lan Chou the day after the attempted shootdown. It was then, and as Mr. Lundhal stated later, that with some difficulty they located a heretofore undetected SAM site. [redacted] showed

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the site not to have been in place. Thus, the SAM Order of Battle, which we used, and the one which we rely on NPIC primarily to provide, was still valid and accurate; at least as far as available photography existed. Suppose we had lost the pilot and plane over Lan Chou on the mission which was fired upon, and assume that a check against available photography had shown a

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heretofore undiscovered site; would question #2 have been asked in the course of the post mission investigation? If it had, the answer would have been "no". The reason it would have been "no" is because we have been operating on an established precedence which we believe to have been working smoothly for at least four years up till now. This precedence involved a system whereby NPIC was kept aware of our intentions at all times and, knowing our target areas and acute interest in the SAM Order of Battle, has kept us up-to-date with what we all believed was an accurate SAM estimate and the best that could be had, based on available photography.

You will note in the documents you have read that we did check [redacted] to see if it provided any new evidence of SAM's. Unfortunately, it did not cover Pao Tou.

Now, to get back to answering your second question, the answer is "yes". But unless you mean did we ask NPIC to specifically search Pao Tou, regardless of whether they had reported Pao Tou in the Immediate Photo Interpretation Report and that ^{in addition} they make a special 50-mile radius

search, regardless of whether they had already done so or not - the answer to this is "we're not sure, but we think a request to that effect did go to NPIC by phone". We actually knew of no reason why the OAK report of [redacted] was not accurate and complete concerning Pao Tou. 25X1

It seems to me it is now obvious the errors made can be traced to two principal points. (1) OSA was in error in believing that NPIC, though made aware constantly of where IDEALIST operations were to be conducted, took no special action to provide information on SAM sites unless specifically tasked to that effect by OSA on a mission-by-mission basis. (2) That NPIC's policy and procedures for SAM search and reporting are such that only by coincidence would OSA have an up-to-date SAM Order of Battle based on all available photography, and regardless of how old the photography was.

To take corrective action for future operations a written memorandum of understanding will be prepared, agreed to jointly by both parties, and submitted to the DDI and DDS&T for concurrence, on the policy and procedures to be used by OSA and NPIC in the future.

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The memorandum will be prepared in such a manner as to preclude a recurrence of the errors committed in connection with the loss of Mission C025C.



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